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Abstract
We conduct an event study of stockholders’ and bondholders’ reactions to companies’ initial
reports of their CEOs’ inside debt positions, as required by SEC disclosure regulations that
became effective early in 2007.  Results show that bond prices rise, equity prices fall, and the
volatility of both securities drops at the time of disclosures by firms whose CEOs have sizeable
pensions or deferred compensation.  The results indicate a transfer of value from equity toward
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1Stockholder and Bondholder Reactions
To Revelations of Large CEO Inside Debt Holdings:
An Empirical Analysis
I. Introduction
In the spring of 2007, new Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations
required U.S. companies to disclose abundant new data about executive compensation.  Among
other items, new variables provided information about equity compensation, perquisites, and
severance packages.  This paper investigates investor reactions to the first disclosures of the
values of CEOs’ pensions and deferred compensation.  These two items together comprise
managers’ “inside debt” claims against their firms, since each represents an fixed liability owed
by the companies to their executives at a future date.
Jensen and Meckling (1976, pp. 352-354) and subsequent authors have argued that inside
debt compensation represents a potential method of reducing the agency costs of debt in a
levered firm.  The agency costs of debt arise from strategies in which management changes the
firm’s investment policy, payout policy, or capital structure in ways that reallocate wealth from
debtholders to stockholders, usually through some increase in the overall risk of the firm. 
Because debtholders rationally anticipate these strategies, they will raise the cost of debt and the
firm’s overall cost of capital in situations that suggest agency costs of debt are likely to be high. 
2To counteract these costs, Jensen and Meckling suggest an optimal incentive structure under
which the manager’s personal holdings of the firm’s debt and equity should occur in a ratio that
mimics the firm’s overall external capital structure.  The authors continue that if a manager’s
inside debt holdings become especially large, exceeding the amount implied by the condition
above, he might manage the firm too conservatively, reducing overall risk in ways that transfer
wealth from stockholders to debtholders.
Our event study analysis tests whether stockholders’ and bondholders’ reactions to
companies’ initial reports of their CEOs’ inside debt positions are consistent with these theories. 
We identify 231 companies whose CEOs have positive inside debt holdings and whose proxy
statements with 2006 compensation data are filed in early 2007 during the first wave of
disclosures under the SEC’s new regulations.  About 45% of these CEOs have excessive inside
debt under the Jensen-Meckling criterion, as their personal inside debt-equity ratios exceed the
external debt-equity ratios of their firms.  As expected, we find evidence of transfers of value
away from equity and toward debt upon revelations that top managers hold large pension and
deferred compensation claims.  Our results show that bond prices rise, equity prices fall, and the
volatility of both securities drops at the time of disclosures by firms whose CEOs have large
inside debt.
Figure 1, a tabulation of monthly regression coefficient estimates, illustrates the overall
pattern of results that we observe.  The figure shows the outcomes of a series of ordinary least
squares regressions over a sample of 911 publicly traded bonds issued by the 231 companies in
our sample.  The dependent variable equals the yield spread for each bond, or the difference
between the bond’s yield to maturity at month-end and the yield on a U.S. Treasury bond of
1 The regressions include a full range of other control variables: firm leverage, firm size (log of equity market
capitalization), return on assets, interest coverage, equity volatility, bond time to maturity, bond coupon rate, the amount
of the bond issue outstanding, and indicator variables for utility industry membership, secured status, callable status, and
credit ratings Baa, Ba, B, and Ca and lower.  Significance levels are determined by robust standard errors clustered by
issuing firm.  The R2 goodness-of-fit measures range from .57 to .74 across the 15 months shown.
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equal maturity.  The coefficient displayed in the figure is the estimate for the influence of the
CEO’s relative debt-equity ratio.  We define this as the ratio of the CEO’s inside debt-equity
ratio over the firm’s external debt-equity ratio, with the CEO’s inside debt-equity ratio equal to
the present value of the CEO’s pension and deferred compensation holdings divided by the value
of his stock and option holdings.1  We estimate the monthly regressions in a piecewise
specification, and the chart shows the estimated slope of the CEO’s relative debt-equity ratio for
the segment above the critical value of 1.00.  As shown in the chart, the CEO’s debt-equity ratio,
which was unknown to investors prior to March 2007, had no significant impact on corporate
bond yields up to that time.  After the initial wave of CEOs’ inside debt disclosures in March
2007, our cross-sectional estimates of the influence of the CEO’s relative debt-equity ratio upon
bond prices become consistently negative as theory would predict, with increasing strength and
statistical significance month-by-month, for those observations in which the CEO’s inside debt-
equity ratio exceeds the firm’s external debt-equity ratio.
By showing that investors take close account of managers’ large inside debt positions
when pricing a firm’s external claims, our results extend a nascent literature that illuminates the
importance of inside debt as an incentive mechanism.  Cross-sectional studies of inside debt’s
role in management compensation have appeared in Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and Gerakos
(2007), and these papers generally provide evidence consistent with the idea that firms use inside
debt compensation when the potential agency costs of debt in their capital structures are high. 
4Sundaram and Yermack find that pension values are higher when leverage is higher, while
Gerakos finds higher pension values in firms with strong credit quality, higher book-to-market
ratios, and lower idiosyncratic risk.  Sundaram and Yermack also find that when managers hold
large inside debt positions, the likelihood of the firm defaulting on its external debt is reduced,
consistent with a hypothesis that these managers operate the firm conservatively in order to
protect debt values.
Other than Jensen and Meckling (1976), only Edmans (2008) has studied the theoretical
implications of inside debt, although the role of incentive compensation in mitigating the agency
costs of debt has been the subject of many papers (see Edmans, 2008, for a survey).
In many ways our empirical results are the mirror image of those reported in the classic
event study by DeFusco, Johnson and Zorn (1990).  In that paper the authors examine the
announcement effects of executive stock option plans introduced by more than 400 firms
between 1978 and 1982.  On average these firms’ stock prices rise, bond prices fall, and equity
volatility rises around the time of the plan disclosures.  The authors interpret these results as
consistent with a pattern of risk shifting, in which both equity and debt investors expect firms to
pursue riskier investment strategies due to the managers’ option-based incentive compensation. 
In our study, the implication of the results is exactly the opposite: to the extent that managers
have large unfunded debt claims against their firms, outside investors expect them to manage
their firms conservatively, implying lower-risk investment strategies that would tend to make
debt safer and equity less attractive.
Our research adds to a growing list of studies using the SEC’s recent disclosure
expansion to illuminate aspects of executive compensation that could not be researched
5previously.  Papers in this category include Grinstein, Weinbaum and Yehuda (2008) and
Andrews, Linn and Yi (2009) (executive perquisites); Murphy and Sandino (2009) and Cadman,
Carter and Hillegeist (2009) (the influence of compensation consultants); and Faulkender and
Yang (2008) and Cadman, Carter, and Semida (2009) (peer groups used for benchmarking
executive incentives).  We also extend the literature on corporate bond event studies, which have
had only a limited presence in empirical corporate finance research because of data availability
limitations.  For examples, see Masulis (1980), Warga and Welch (1993), and Maxwell and
Stephens (2003).
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows.  Section II describes the
sample selection process and the resulting dataset.  Section III contains the main event study
analysis.  Section IV presents a discussion of the results and conclusion.
II. Sample Selection and Data Description
Although not used by all companies, inside debt compensation for executives generally
consists of two pieces: defined benefit pensions and deferred compensation.  Pension benefits
may sometimes be negotiated, but they usually accrue to managers under company-wide
formulas established by each company, often based upon years of service with the firm and each
executive’s average level of cash compensation.  When an executive retires, he can draw the
pension in the form of a life annuity or as a single lump sum, equal to the actuarially calculated
present value of expected lifetime benefits.  Deferred compensation, in contrast, accrues if the
executive makes a discretionary investment decision that involves him lending money back to
his firm by foregoing cash compensation that he would otherwise be entitled to receive in the
2 Seven CEOs had inside debt balances exceeding $100 million at fiscal year-end 2006 on the latest release of
the ExecuComp database.  More than two-thirds of the CEOs in the database had nonzero inside debt, with a mean value
of $5.7 million.  In general inside debt compensation is more common among larger firms in slower growth sectors of the
economy such as manufacturing, utilities, and transportation.
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current period.  Deferred compensation may often be invested either at a fixed rate of return, or
in the company’s stock, or in a menu of stock or bond mutual funds chosen by the firm.
For both pension benefits and deferred compensation balances, the amounts due to
executives are almost always unfunded and unsecured, so these sums are at risk like other
unsecured debt if the firm became financially distressed.  In addition to the incentive
implications of these plans, a major motivation for executives to receive inside debt
compensation is that its taxation is almost always deferred until the executive receives payouts
when retired.
In some companies managers’ inside debt values can be large, sometimes exceeding $100
million and occasionally amounting to a greater sum than a manager’s equity investments in his
firm’s stock or stock options.2  However, until 2007 managers’ inside debt values were almost
never disclosed under the SEC’s executive compensation reporting requirements previously in
effect.  Companies were required to provide certain details about the pension benefits due to an
executive, but calculating the expected present value of an individual manager’s pension
required combining the disclosed data with information from a number of external sources and
making sophisticated actuarial computations, a task probably beyond the skills of most investors
and even Wall Street analysts (see Sundaram and Yermack, 2007).  Even less was disclosed
about deferred compensation; most firms did not even have to report whether their executives
even participated in a deferred compensation plan, and in the few cases in which these
3 Companies had to report only those cases in which the executive received a fixed rate of interest on his
deferred compensation, and only if the fixed rate exceeded the “applicable federal rate,” an estimate of the risk-free rate
specified by the Internal Revenue Service.  In practice, very few plans had this structure, as most firms do not offer high
fixed-rate interest as an investment option.
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disclosures were required,3 the balances held by individual managers were never given.  When
the SEC announced a pending revision of its executive compensation disclosure rules in late
2006, providing more information about pensions and deferred compensation was a major
priority.
Because the new reports of managers’ pension and deferred compensation balances in
early 2007 were highly anticipated by the community of executive compensation analysts,
consultants, and researchers, we hypothesize that companies’ stock and bond prices should have
reacted significantly for companies in which these inside debt balances were revealed to be
large.  Our research strategy uses standard event study methodology to capture stock and bond
investors’ immediate reactions to companies’ disclosures.  Therefore, we focus upon publicly
traded firms that also had  publicly traded long-term debt outstanding at year-end 2006, the time
at which the SEC’s new disclosure regulations became effective.
We begin by identifying all non-financial Compustat firms with fiscal years ending in
December 2006 or later for which Moody’s provides a senior bond rating.  After discarding a
small number of companies with faulty or incomplete compensation disclosures, we retain all
firms that file proxy statements with the SEC between January 1, 2007, and April 30, 2007 and
report nonzero inside debt holdings for their CEOs.  Within this group, we look at the subset that
have fixed-rate publicly traded bonds listed on the Mergent Fixed Investment Security Database
in the form of either non-convertible debentures, medium-term notes or zero-coupon bonds. 
This set of screens give us a preliminary sample of 286 firms.  We then require each company to
4 Our computations for bond returns and volatility rely on end-of-day pricing quotes provided by Reuters, which
gathers the data each day based upon market quotes.  Actual bond transaction prices are rare, because most corporate
bonds trade infrequently.  Reuters gathers quotes for corporate bonds throughout each trading day, even if those bonds do
not trade.  At the end of the day it posts provisional prices for individual bonds and then allows for a “market challenge”
period in which clients can submit evidence to challenge Reuters’ pricing, with the vendor making adjustments to its
posted prices if warranted.
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have daily bond pricing data in the Reuters database between June 2006 and August 2007, to
have non-missing data for the bond rating, amount outstanding, and time to maturity as of the
proxy statement filing date, to have a minimum maturity of one year, and at least 60 end-of-day
bond pricing quotes in the 90-day periods before and after the filing date.4  These screens cause
us to discard 55 firms, resulting in a final sample of 231 companies which together have a total
of 911 distinct bond issues.
Figure 2 shows a timeline of the proxy statement filing dates for the 231 firms that we
study.  We use these filing dates as the event dates in our analysis, as the SEC always posts
incoming documents on its EDGAR website for public viewing within hours their receipt.  In
214 cases, the information about CEOs’ inside debt holdings was revealed in a definitive proxy
statement filed with the SEC at some point during the month of March 2007.  In 17 cases firms
filed a preliminary proxy statement with full compensation data several weeks in advance of
their final proxy filing, with the preliminary document available for public viewing.  In these 17
cases we use the earlier date as the event date, with the first of these disclosures coming on
January 18, 2007.  Among other patterns, Figure 2 shows a tendency for firms to file proxy
statements on Fridays, and it indicates that the first wave of compensation disclosures under the
new rules began in earnest during the second week of March 2007 and began to taper off by the
end of that month (regulations require firms to make compensation disclosures within 120 days
of fiscal year-end, though most comply sooner).  We do not extend our sample to companies that
9filed their first compensation disclosures beyond the end of April, because we are concerned
about the informativeness of these later filings.  We conjecture that once investors had seen the
inside debt positions of managers at several hundred firms, they would have been able to
estimate with some precision the holdings of CEOs at companies that had not yet filed and thus
would not react as strongly to the later disclosures.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics about the 231 firms and 911 bond issues that we
study.  Most of our sample companies are large, well-known firms with moderate leverage and
investment grade credit ratings.  Although we consider all Compustat firms for inclusion in our
study, inside debt compensation plans are much more common among larger firms than smaller
ones, and a large majority of our sample companies are well-known S&P 500 firms.  The typical
CEO in our sample is 56 years old and has held his position for a mean of five (median of three)
years, although he was likely accumulating inside debt while holding junior management
positions prior to becoming CEO.
To value each CEO’s holdings of inside debt and equity, we use information in each
proxy statement.  We take the present value of pension benefits and deferred compensation
balances as reported by the company.  We calculate stock ownership value by multiplying shares
held (including restricted shares) times the stock price on December 31, 2006.  We value stock
options by applying the Black-Scholes formula to each individual tranche of options held by the
CEO and summing the tranche values to an aggregate total.  The CEOs in our sample hold a
mean (median) of $9.5 million ($5.0 million) of inside debt in their firms, according to the values
reported by the companies in our sample, with the majority in the form of pension benefits.  The
personal inside debt-equity ratio, comparing the value of a CEO’s inside debt over his inside
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equity, has a mean of 0.49 and median of 0.26.  In 104 cases out of the 231 firms that we study,
or 45%, the CEO’s personal inside debt-equity ratio exceeds the company’s external debt-equity
ratio, providing the apparent incentives for overly conservative management identified by Jensen
and Meckling (1976).
Figure 3 shows a scatter plot of the CEO’s personal inside debt-equity ratio against the
external debt-equity ratio of the firm.  Many observations cluster near the 45-degree line, where
the ratio between the two values equals the Jensen-Meckling optimum of 1.00.  Observations in
the upper left part of the chart are those in which the CEO has relatively high equity incentives in
a firm with a levered capital structure.  In this area, one would expect the CEO to pursue very
risky investments and the agency costs of debt to be high.  In the lower right of the chart, the
opposite situation prevails, with the CEO having a high inside debt position in a relatively
unlevered firm.  In this area one would expect the opposite agency problem, a CEO managing
the firm very conservatively even though the external claimholders would have little reason to be
concerned about risk-shifting between equity and debt.
III. Analysis
A. Univariate analysis of abnormal returns
We begin by examining the unconditional abnormal returns to debt and equity securities
of all 231 firms in our sample around the dates of their proxy statement filings in early 2007. 
We calculate equity abnormal returns using the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model, with a
120-day parameter estimation period ending 10 days prior to the event day and the S&P 500
index as the market index.  Bond abnormal returns are based upon a two-factor model, using the
5 We test the sensitivity of our results to these assumptions by changing the abnormal return on non-traded debt
to equal the abnormal return on traded debt, and also by changing the weight for non-traded debt to equal the book value
of long-term debt minus the book value of traded debt.  We also tested other cases assuming that the return on non-traded
debt equaled the minimum, maximum, and mean return on traded debt for firms with multiple traded bond issues
outstanding.   In all cases the estimated firm CAR is virtually identical in size and significance, so we use the assumptions
above in the analysis throughout the paper.
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Citigroup Investment-Grade and Speculative-Grade corporate bond indexes and a 90-day parameter
estimation period.  These abnormal returns are calculated separately for all 911 publicly traded
bond issues associated with our 231 sample firms.  Finally, we combine the abnormal stock and
bond returns into an overall “firm abnormal return” for each of our 231 companies.  Firm
abnormal returns equal weighted averages of the abnormal returns to the stock and bonds issued
by each firm, with the weights equal to the total outstanding market value of each security as of
the event day.  If a firm also has debt that is not publicly traded, we include it in the weighted
average, with the weight equal to the difference between the book value of total debt and the
book value of traded debt, and the abnormal return of non-traded debt assumed to equal zero.5
Table 2 shows the mean cumulative abnormal returns for the samples of stocks, bonds,
and firms overall, over a two-day event window that includes the SEC filing date and the
subsequent trading date; we use a two-day window because some filings occur late in the day
after the market has closed.  The overall pattern of returns in the entire sample seems
uninteresting, but we find significant differences in the returns to bondholders after partitioning
the sample based upon whether the CEO’s personal inside debt-equity ratio is less than or greater
than the firm’s external debt-equity ratio.  In the former case, shown in Panel B of Table 2, we
find negative and significant bondholder returns upon the disclosure of the CEOs’ relatively low
inside debt positions.  In the latter case, shown in Table C, we find positive and significant
bondholder returns when high CEO inside debt holdings are disclosed.  These results are in line
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with our expectations, although we do not find significant results in either subsample for returns
to equityholders or to the firm overall.
B. Regression analysis of abnormal returns
Table 3 presents ordinary least squares regression estimates that explore the cross-
sectional determinants of the cumulative abnormal returns for stocks, bonds, and firms overall,
with the dependent variables defined as in Table 2 above.  The main control variable in the
regressions is the CEO’s relative debt-equity ratio, equal to the CEO’s personal inside debt-
equity ratio divided by the firm’s external debt-equity ratio.  In the right half of the table, we use
this variable in a piecewise specification, with the estimated slope allowed to vary above the
below the critical value of 1.00, where the CEO’s personal leverage just equals the firm’s overall
leverage.  In the left half of the table, the variable is used with a single slope estimated over its
entire range.
In addition, we include a variety of control variables in our regressions, because the
compensation disclosures that we study occur in a lengthy document, the proxy statement for the
annual shareholder meeting.  Due to the comprehensive nature of shareholder proxy statements,
it is possible that disclosures of CEOs’ inside debt holdings might systematically occur in
tandem with other types of important corporate governance revelations (Brickley, 1986).  A very
large number of event studies over the past 20 years have used proxy statement filing dates as
the basis for studying investor reactions to CEO pay, changes in the board of directors,
shareholder resolutions, and numerous other topics.  We therefore read each of the 231 proxy
statements in our sample and identify those that report other events likely to be important to
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shareholders.  After tabulating these data, we use nine indicator variables as controls in our
regression in Table 3.  These control variables include an indicator that equals one for 23 firms
that nominate of new independent directors (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990) and an additional
indicator for three firms that disclose nominations of new grey directors who have conflicts of
interest (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999); an indicator for 25 firms that disclose personal aircraft
use by the CEO as a perquisite, after never having made such disclosures in the past (Yermack,
2006); indicator variables for firms in which management proposes shareholder-friendly
governance changes, including rescinding super-majority voting requirements (nine firms),
introducing majority voting in director elections (11 firms), and declassifying a staggered board
of directors (14 firms) (Faleye, 2007); and indicators for firms that receive shareholder
resolutions related to the areas of executive compensation (45 firms), other corporate governance
issues (61 firms), and social or environmental issues (38 firms) (Karpoff, Malatesta, and
Walkling, 1996).  Finally, we include two more control variables, an indicator for whether the
firm’s debt is rated as speculative grade (BB+ or below), and a further indicator for whether the
firm operates primarily in the utility industry (SIC code 49), since a large number of these
companies appear in our sample.  We test the statistical significance of our estimates using
robust standard errors, which are clustered at the firm level in the bond CAR regressions.
Estimates in the left half of Table 3 indicate that the abnormal two-day returns to
bondholders are positively related to the relative debt-equity ratio of the CEO.  This result is
consistent with our prediction, as it implies that revelations of CEOs holding large inside debt
positions (those in the lower right region of Figure 3) are welcomed by bondholders, who expect
these managers to pursue conservative, low-risk operating strategies.  We do not find significant
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estimates for the abnormal returns to equityholders or the firm overall.
In the right half of Table 3, we decompose the CEO’s relative debt-equity ratio into two
pieces, with the slope allowed to change at the critical value of 1.00.  We find a pattern of
significant results for the upper part of the variable, when inside debt is high.  When the CEO’s
personal inside leverage exceeds the firm’s leverage, it exhibits a negative and significant
association with stockholder abnormal returns and a positive and significant association with
bondholder returns.  For the firm overall, the abnormal returns are negatively and significantly
related to the relative inside debt ratio of the CEO in its higher-valued region.  Together, these
results indicate that when large inside debt positions are disclosed, stock prices fall and bond
prices rise, but the negative impact on equity value exceeds the positive gains to bondholders.  In
other words, a heavy reliance on inside debt compensation appears to reduce the overall value of
the firm, apparently by providing incentives for overly conservative management.
Of the control variables, none of those displayed in Figure 3 has a significant estimate,
and the large majority of the proxy statement indicator variables have insignificant estimates as
well.
C. Changes in volatility for debt, equity, and the firm overall
We find a general pattern of gains to bondholders and losses to equity holders when firms
disclose large inside debt holdings by their CEOs.  These returns are consistent with investors
expecting a more conservative, lower-risk operating strategy.  In addition to the valuation
changes we observe, these investor expectations should also imply lower dispersion in daily
stock returns.  We test this possibility by examining changes in security price volatility before
6 The approach is very similar to that used in Sundaram and Yermack (2007).  We assume that each firm has a
default point equal to the face value of short-term debt plus half the face value of long-term debt.  Equity is treated as a
Black-Scholes call option on the assets of the firm, with maturity of one year and exercise price equal to the default point. 
Using the risk-free rate, the firm’s market capitalization of equity, and its volatility of equity as additional inputs, it is
straightforward to solve for the volatility of cash flows to the firm’s assets.
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and after the proxy statement filing date when the CEO’s inside debt holdings are first disclosed. 
Our approach is similar to that used in other papers that study volatility changes in order to infer
differences in risk before and after certain events, such as the study of CEO turnover and equity
volatility by Clayton, Hartzell, and Rosenberg (2005).
To study changes in volatility, we estimate the time series volatility of all stocks and
bonds during the period 90 days prior to the proxy statement filing date, and again for the period
90 days after.  For bonds, some of which have irregular trading histories and are more subject to
data errors due to market illiquidity, we require at least 60 days of daily quote data within each
90-day window in order for the security to be in the sample.  We also winsorize the bond return
data, which exhibits some extreme values, by truncating all values above the 95th percentile or
below the 5th percentile of the daily returns distribution over the 180-day window that we study
for each bond.  
After estimating the volatilities for each stock and bond in the sample, we calculate a
volatility change ratio for each security by dividing its post-filing volatility into its pre-filing
volatility and taking the natural log of this ratio.  Finally, we estimate the asset volatility for the
firm overall pre- and post-filing.  Asset volatility cannot be observed directly, so we use the
KMV method to estimate it by a numerical iteration algorithm.6  We then calculate a firm
volatility change ratio that is analogous to the change ratios for debt and equity volatility.
Regression analysis of these volatility change ratios appears in Table 4.  The control variables,
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standard error calculations, and other aspects of the regressions are the same as used in the
models of abnormal returns that appear above in Table 3, except that we add an additional
control variable to each regression, the contemporaneous volatility change ratio for either the
equity or bond market index.  
In our volatility analysis, we find a clear pattern of reduced volatility after those proxy
statement filings that indicate large inside debt holdings by CEOs.  In the left half of Table 4, we
show negative and significant estimates for the relations between the relative debt-equity ratio of
the CEO and the volatilities of debt, equity, and the overall firm.  In the right half of the table,
we again decompose the relative debt-equity ratio of the CEO into two segments, with the slope
allowed to vary above and below the critical value of 1.00.  We find that negative and significant
relations between the CEO’s personal leverage and security volatility changes are concentrated
entirely in the segment that lies above 1.00 and implies large managerial inside debt holdings.  In
all three cases of debt volatility, equity volatility, and asset volatility, the estimated coefficients
are stronger and have greater statistical significance in the top segment; all are estimated as
positive but insigificant in the lower segment that lies below 1.00.  Overall, these results show a
clear and consistent pattern, that investors react to large inside debt disclosures not only by
revaluing debt and equity claims against the firm, but also by trading these claims in a pattern
that exhibits lower price variability.
D. Regression analysis of credit spreads
Many of our strongest results in Tables 3 and 4 concern the impact of CEO inside debt
disclosures upon bond prices and bond volatility.  We investigate whether these changes are
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long-lived by studying pricing in our panel of corporate bonds before and after the dates when
firms make their annual compensation disclosures.  We estimate a panel regression in which the
dependent variable is each bond’s credit spread, or the bond’s yield in excess of a U.S. Treasury
bond of equivalent maturity.  The sample period for the regression runs from June 2006 to
August 2007, and we use month-end yields for each bond as the observations.  We partition the
sample into two parts based upon whether the observation occurs before or after the month of the
firm’s proxy statement filing that discloses the CEO’s inside debt holdings.  As shown in Figure
2, for most companies in the sample this partitioning will occur either in March or April 2007.
Our main explanatory variable in the panel regression is the relative CEO debt-equity
ratio, defined as above, and used in both its regular and piecewise specifications.  We also
include a large range of control variables used in standard panel regression models of bond
yields (see, e.g., Cremers, Nair, and Wei, 2007).  These variables include firm leverage, the log
of equity market capitalization, the log of the amount outstanding for each debt issue, return on
assets, interest coverage, equity volatility, bond time to maturity, bond coupon rate, indicator
variables for the issuer operating in the utility industry, secured status and callable status, and
indicator variables for different rating classes.
Results of the credit spread estimation appear in Table 5.  We find that the CEO’s debt-
equity ratio enters the model with a negative and significant effect as expected.  However, the
result is weaker in magnitude and lacks statistical significance in the months before a company
discloses its CEO’s inside debt holdings.  After the disclosure, the association between the
CEO’s personal leverage and the credit spread becomes negative and significant.  We observe
this pattern both when using the regular specification of the variable and when using the
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piecewise specification.  In the latter case, the significant association is confined to the upper
portion of the variable, the region in which the CEO’s relative debt-equity ratio exceeds the
critical value of 1.00.  We conclude that once bondholders learn that a CEO holds an important
position in the debt of his own firm, the bond will trade at a lower yield to maturity, holding all
else constant.
IV. Conclusions
In this paper we examine the impact of companies’ first required disclosures of their
CEOs’ inside debt holdings in early 2007.  Although pensions and deferred compensation
represent important aspects of executive compensation, very little information was available
about them prior to the SEC’s expansion of disclosure requirements at the end of 2006.
We find that investors react significantly when a company reports that the CEO holds a
large amount of inside debt relative to his equity investment in the firm.  Under these conditions,
equity prices tend to fall while bond prices tend to rise.  The net effect appears to destroy value
overall, as the gains to bondholders appear to be more than offset by losses to stockholders. 
These valuation changes appear to persist in corporate bond prices for many months after the
disclosure date.  In addition to the valuation effects that we observe, we find that the volatility of
both stocks and bonds falls when large CEO inside debt positions are revealed. 
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Figure 1
Influence of CEO’s debt-equity ratio on corporate bond yield spreads
The figure shows monthly ordinary least squares regression coefficient estimates for the
association between a CEO’s debt-equity ratio and the yield to maturity of a firm’s corporate
bonds, measured as the spread above the yield of a U.S. Treasury bond of equal maturity at
month-end.  Regressions are estimated for a sample of 911 bonds issued by 231 firms, although
not all observations appear in each month’s sample.  The CEO’s debt-equity ratio equals the
present value of his pension plus deferred compensation claims against his firm, divided by the
value of his stock and stock option ownership.  The regression uses a piecewise linear
specification for this variable, with the slope permitted to change above and below the value of
1.  The coefficients displayed in the graph are for the segment above 1.  Pension and deferred
compensation values are reported by firms in their annual proxy statements filed mostly in
March 2007, and stock option values are calculated using the Black-Scholes method from data
reported in the same filings.  Other control variables in each regression include firm leverage,
firm size (log of assets), return on assets, interest coverage, equity volatility, bond time to
maturity, bond coupon rate, the amount of the bond issue outstanding, and indicator variables for
secured status, callable status, and credit ratings A, Baa, Ba, B, and Ca and lower.  Significance
levels are determined by robust standard errors clustered by issuing firm.  The R2 goodness-of-fit

































































































Event dates of sample companies
The chart shows the dates on which proxy statements were filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission by 231 firms whose CEOs held nonzero inside debt in their firms at the
end of 2006.  The sample includes all Compustat firms with sufficient data available about
management compensation and outstanding bond issues.  Of the 231 firms, 210 made their
disclosures in definitive proxy statements filed beginning February 23, 2007, while the


































































































































Firm leverage and CEO personal leverage
The figure shows a scatter plot of the CEO’s personal leverage on the x-axis and the firm’s
external leverage on the y-axis.  The sample includes 231 observations for firms that reported
executive compensation data in proxy statements filed in the spring of 2007.  The CEO’s
personal leverage equals the value of inside debt claims (pension and deferred compensation)
divided by the value of equity ownership (shares and stock options).  The firm’s leverage equals
the book value of total debt divided by the market capitalization of common stock.  The value of
the CEO’s inside debt position is reported in proxy statement filings, while the value of CEO
stock option holdings is based upon Black-Scholes calculations using characteristics of
individual option holdings as disclosed in proxy statements.
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Descriptive statistics for a sample of 231 firms with 911 identified public debt issues outstanding at the end of
2006, in which the CEO holds a nonzero amount of inside debt.  The sample includes all Compustat firms with
December fiscal year-ends and bond data available on the Moody’s Rating Database and the Mergent Fixed
Investment Security Database.  All dollar values are in millions.  CEO compensation data is based upon
information disclosed in proxy statements filed early in 2007, with option values based upon Black-Scholes
estimates using data for each individual option tranche outstanding.  The CEO’s debt equity ratio equals the
value of inside debt (pension + deferred compensation) divided by the value of inside equity (stock + options). 
Leverage equals total debt (book value) over total assets.  Return on assets equals EBITDA over total assets. 
Equity volatility is calculated from daily return data over the 180 days prior to the proxy statement filing date. 
Bond volatility is calculated from daily return data over the 90 days prior to the filing date.  The investment
grade indicators for each bond and each firm equal 1 based the Standard & Poor’s rating is BB+ or higher as



































































































































































































































Abnormal Returns Around Dates of Inside Debt Disclosures
Cumulative abnormal returns to debt and equity securities issued by 231 firms upon disclosures of their
CEOs’ inside debt holdings in proxy statements filed in early 2007.  The sample includes all Compustat
firms with December fiscal year-ends and bond data available on the Moody’s Rating Database and the
Mergent Fixed Investment Security Database.  All cumulative abnormal returns are calculated over a two-
day window that includes the proxy filing date and the subsequent date.  Equity abnormal returns are
calculated using the Fama-French-Carhart four factor model with the S&P 500 index as the market index. 
Bond abnormal returns are based upon a two-factor model using the Citigroup Investment-Grade and
Speculative-Grade corporate bond indexes.  The Firm abnormal return is based upon a weighted average
of the returns to each firm’s equity and debt securities, with the weights equal to the market value of the
total amount outstanding for each traded security and the book value of non-traded debt.  We assume that
the abnormal return to non-traded debt is zero.  Panel A shows results for the entire sample.  Panel B
shows results for the subsample of CEOs whose personal debt-equity ratio is below the debt-equity ratio
of the firm’s capital structure.  The CEO’s debt-equity ratio equals the present value of his pension plus
deferred compensation claims against his firm, divided by the value of his stock and stock option
ownership.    Panel C shows results for the subsample of all other observations.
Panel A: All observations
Variable N (securities) N(firms) Mean t-statistic
Equity CAR (0, 1) 231 231 0.138% 0.95
Bond CAR (0, 1) 911 231 -0.002% -0.31
Firm CAR (0, 1) 231 0.096% 1.00
Panel B: CEO relative leverage <=1
Variable N (securities) N(firms) Mean t-statistic
Equity CAR (0, 1) 126 126 0.131% 0.54
Bond CAR (0, 1) 524 126 -0.024% -2.10
Firm CAR (0, 1) 126 0.092% 0.61
Panel C: CEO relative leverage >1
Variable N (securities) N(firms) Mean t-statistic
Equity CAR (0, 1) 105 105 0.147% 1.10
Bond CAR (0, 1) 387 105 0.027% 5.01
Firm CAR (0, 1) 105 0.100% 0.92
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Table 3
Regression Estimates of Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Ordinary least squares regression estimates of the cumulative abnormal returns to investors in 231 firms around the dates of proxy
statement filings in early 2007.  The Equity CAR is the cumulative abnormal stock return estimated from the market model.  The
Bond CAR is the cumulative abnormal return to holders of 911 publicly traded bonds, also estimated from the market model.  The
Firm CAR is a weighted average of the Equity and Bond CARs calculated using assumptions given in the text.  All CARs are
estimated over a two-day interval including the event day and subsequent trading day.  The CEO’s debt-equity ratio is the value of the
CEO’s inside debt holdings (pension plus deferred compensation) divided by the value of his inside equity holdings (stock plus stock
options).  The relative CEO debt-equity ratio is the CEO’s debt-equity ratio divided by the firm’s external debt-equity ratio.  The
estimate for this variable is disaggregated into two components based upon whether the ratio is greater than or less than 1.  The
speculative grade rating indicator equals 1 if a bond is rated BB+ or lower for the debt regressions, and if the firm’s S&P long-term
debt rating is BB+ or lower for the equity and firm regressions.  The nine proxy statement control variables are dummy variables that
equal 1 when certain corporate governance events, described more fully in the text, are reported in the proxy statement used in the















Relative CEO debt-equity ratio
Relative CEO debt-equity ratio up to 1.00
Relative CEO debt-equity ratio above 1.00




















































Proxy statement control variables (9)

























Significant at 1% (a), 5% (b), and 10% (c) levels.
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Table 4
Regression Estimates of Changes in Volatility
Ordinary least squares regression estimates of the changes in volatility around the dates of proxy statement filings for securities issued
by 231 firms in early 2007.  All volatility changes equal the log of the ratio of volatility estimated over the 90-day period after the
filing date, divided by the volatility measured in the 90 prior to the filing date.  Asset volatility is determined in the KMV framework
using numerical solutions.  The CEO’s debt-equity ratio is the value of the CEO’s inside debt holdings (pension plus deferred
compensation) divided by the value of his inside equity holdings (stock plus stock options).  The relative CEO debt-equity ratio is the
CEO’s debt-equity ratio divided by the firm’s external debt-equity ratio.  The estimate for this variable is disaggregated into two
components based upon whether the ratio is greater than or less than 1.  The speculative grade rating indicator equals 1 if a bond is
rated BB+ or lower for the debt regressions, and if the firm’s S&P long-term debt rating is BB+ or lower for the equity and firm
regressions.  The nine proxy statement control variables are dummy variables that equal 1 when certain corporate governance events,
described more fully in the text, are reported in the proxy statement used in the analysis.  Huber-White robust standard errors appear





















Relative CEO debt-equity ratio
Relative CEO debt-equity ratio up to 1.00
Relative CEO debt-equity ratio above 1.00
CRSP equal-weighted market index volatility change
Merrill Lynch corporate bond index volatility change
































































Proxy statement control variables (9)

























Significant at 1% (a), 5% (b), and 10% (c) levels.
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Table 5
Regression analysis of corporate bond credit spreads
Panel regression coefficient estimates for the credit spread of a firm’s corporate bonds, measured
as the spread above the yield of a U.S. Treasury bond of equal maturity at month-end. 
Regressions are estimated for a sample of 911 bonds issued by 231 firms over the 15-month
period between June 2006 and August 2007.  The sample is partitioned according to whether the
firm has filed its first proxy statement disclosing the value of inside debt positions held by the
CEO.  As shown in Figure 2, most of these filings occurred in March or April, 2007, and the
filing month itself is included in the post-filing subsample.  The CEO’s debt-equity ratio equals
the present value of his pension plus deferred compensation claims against his firm, divided by
the value of his stock and stock option ownership.  The regressions in the right two columns use
a piecewise linear specification for this variable, with the slope permitted to change above and
below the value of 1.  In addition to those tabulated, other control variables in each regression
include firm leverage, the log of equity market capitalization, the log of the amount outstanding
for each debt issue, return on assets, interest coverage, equity volatility, bond time to maturity,
bond coupon rate, and indicator variables for secured status and callable status.  Financial market
variables are measured at the end of the prior fiscal year, and equity market capitalization is
measured at each month-end.  Significance levels are determined by robust standard errors
clustered by issuing firm.
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Dependent variable: bond credit spread (bond yield - U.S. Treasury yield for same maturity)
Pre-filing Post-filing Pre-filing Post-filing
Constant
Relative CEO debt-equity ratio
Relative CEO debt-equity ratio up to 1.00



























































































Significant at 1% (a), 5% (b), and 10% (c) levels.
